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Was Newtonian Cosmology Really 
Inconsistent?1 
 
Peter Vickers 
 
Centre for History and Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, UK 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas 
Malament (1995) has shown that Newtonian cosmology is not inconsistent, to date 
there has been no analysis of Norton’s claim (1995) that Newtonian cosmology was 
inconsistent prior to certain advances in the 1930s, and in particular prior to Seeliger’s 
seminal paper of 1895. In this paper I agree that there are assumptions, Newtonian and 
cosmological in character, and relevant to the real history of science, which are 
inconsistent. But there are some important corrections to make to Norton’s account. 
Here I display for the first time the inconsistencies—four in total—in all their detail. 
Although this extra detail shows there to be several different inconsistencies, it also 
goes some way towards explaining why they went unnoticed for two hundred years. 
 
1. Introduction 
2. The concept Newtonian cosmology 
3. How was Newtonian cosmology inconsistent? 
     3.1 A contradiction of forces 
          3.1.1 …using Newton’s law of gravitation? 
          3.1.2 …using Poisson’s equation? 
          3.1.3 …reasoning from symmetry 
     3.2 An indeterminacy contradiction 
          3.2.1 …using Newton’s law of gravitation 
          3.2.2 …from summing the potential φ 
          3.2.3 …using Poisson’s equation 
4. Why weren’t the inconsistencies noticed? 
     4.1 Because the right question wasn’t asked 
     4.2 Because of confusion about non-convergent series 
5. Conclusion 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is now a substantial literature devoted to inconsistencies in science, with 
examples ranging from the early calculus of Newton and Leibniz to Bohr’s 
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theory of the atom to, most recently, classical electrodynamics. Norton (2002) 
introduces two different approaches to inconsistencies: the ‘content driven’ 
approach and the ‘logic driven’ approach. Preferring the latter are several 
authors (see Meheus 2002) who suggest that, when faced with an inconsistency 
in a given body of assumptions, scientists either do (descriptive claim) or 
should (normative claim) adopt a non-classical, paraconsistent logic which 
saves them from deriving anything and everything by ECQ.
2
 Norton, in 
response, suggests a ‘content driven’ approach where the inconsistency is or 
should be handled by ‘[reflecting] on the specific content of the physical theory 
at hand’, whilst maintaining classical deductive logic (2002, p.192). 
Both sides of this debate are concerned to address the question of what 
scientists do or should do when faced with inconsistency. This is of clear 
importance, not least because it could give us important clues as to how we 
might progress in the face of current conflicts, such as that between general 
relativity and quantum field theory. However, the focus of this paper lies 
entirely outside of this debate, and addresses a different aspect of inconsistency 
in science which has been largely neglected. Just as important as the pragmatic 
question of what to do when faced with an inconsistency is the epistemic 
question of how scientists come to know about inconsistencies in a given body 
of assumptions in the first place. In particular we may ask the questions, 
 
(i) What is it about the scientific community which prevents an 
inconsistency from being noticed? 
(ii) What is it about the science which prevents an inconsistency from 
being noticed? 
 
There are far fewer papers dedicated to these kinds of question, but research 
here could also carry importance for current science: if we could accelerate the 
identification of conflicts in science we could accelerate science itself. 
The focus of attention in this paper will be what is usually called (an old 
version of) ‘Newtonian cosmology’. In 1895 Seeliger made the remarkable 
claim that a set of natural (Newtonian) assumptions concerning forces in the 
universe—assumptions which had been in place since Newton himself, for over 
two hundred years—are mutually inconsistent. This stimulated much debate 
over the years and decades which followed, with the latest additions made by 
Norton (1993, 1995, 1999, 2002) and Malament (1995). But questions (i) and 
(ii), above, remain largely unasked. What was it about the nature of the 
inconsistency in Newtonian cosmology which meant that it went unnoticed by 
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 3 
the scientific community for two centuries? 
If the derivations were long and complicated, and involved advanced 
mathematics or even mathematics not available to scientists in the relevant 
period, then our question would be answered immediately: the reason the 
contradiction remained hidden would be that it was exceedingly difficult to 
derive. But one look at Norton’s reconstructions shows that no such quick 
answer will be forthcoming. For one thing, there are at least two different 
inconsistencies, so there is double the chance of noticing the problem. But even 
more remarkably, it would seem that in each case a contradiction follows from 
a few basic assumptions in a few simple steps. The inconsistencies are, as 
Malament puts it, ‘so close to the surface that they are hard to miss’ (1995, 
p.489). This in itself seems to contradict the fact that many great scientists did 
miss the inconsistencies for a period of two hundred years! Otherwise we 
would apparently have to admit either that scientists made a serious 
commitment to what they knew to be impossible, or that they were blind to 
some of the most obvious consequences of their beliefs. 
This suggests that the reason the inconsistency remained hidden lies with the 
scientific community rather than the science itself. However, as this paper sets 
out to show, there are several complications to work through to understand the 
inconsistencies properly: they are not as simple and straightforward as Norton 
and Malament make out. Thus, after a brief section (§2) in which I introduce 
‘Newtonian cosmology’ and the relevant assumptions, I turn to the details of 
the inconsistency claims which have been made. Four different inconsistencies 
are distinguished, which are grouped into two types of inconsistency discussed 
separately in §3.1 and §3.2. This analysis uncovers certain complications in the 
science which then help to answer question (ii) in §4. Some factors pertinent to 
question (i) are also brought to light. §5 is the conclusion. 
 
 
2. The concept Newtonian cosmology 
 
What is the theory of ‘Newtonian cosmology’? It would be a mistake to 
suppose that Newtonian cosmology ‘exists’ somehow, perfectly formed, in a 
textbook somewhere, and that all we have to do is identify it and see if it is 
inconsistent. Rather, what we really find are various assumptions, often 
differently stated by different individuals, sometimes saying the same thing and 
sometimes something slightly different. Some of these assumptions are clearly 
about the universe as a whole, others about the local universe, others of a more 
metaphysical nature. Still other assumptions may never be articulated, such as 
that space is Euclidean or that the night sky is dark. There is often no correct 
way to articulate such assumptions precisely, and no specific set of them which 
together constitute ‘Newtonian cosmology’. What, then, do we mean when we 
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refer to ‘Newtonian cosmology’? What do we mean when we say it is 
inconsistent? 
People mean different things by the word ‘theory’. The question is not who is 
right but which conception of ‘theory’ is the right one to use for a given 
investigation.
3
 The present concern is to investigate the inconsistency of 
Newtonian cosmology, but still this is too vague to tell us which assumptions 
we should be concerned with: we must ask what we are hoping to show by the 
inconsistency of the theory. For example, we will choose different assumptions, 
and aim at something quite different, if we want to show that the assumptions 
used by scientists were inconsistent (but that the inconsistency somehow didn’t 
affect their reasoning) or if we want to show that the assumptions believed by 
scientists were inconsistent (but that they somehow didn’t notice it). The more 
interesting claim for present purposes is the latter, because what seems to be the 
case is that there is a set of assumptions which are inconsistent, all of which 
were believed to be true—or at least important candidates for the truth—by a 
significant number of relevant individuals. However, focusing on belief in this 
way still doesn’t enable us to identify a set of assumptions for investigation. 
There are many different species of ‘belief’, and even if there were not it isn’t 
clear which beliefs should be grouped together to count as ‘Newtonian 
cosmology’. 
Thankfully there is another way to proceed. Instead of trying to group 
together the assumptions for which inconsistency would be interesting, one can 
instead group together the assumptions which are inconsistent, and then 
investigate how interesting that inconsistency is. Of course some sense of 
which assumptions are going to be important is required: there has to be some 
reason why the assumptions will be interesting as a group. The reason here, as 
made clear in Norton’s papers, is the role they play in answering a single 
question: 
 
(Q) What is the net gravitational force on a test particle at a given time at an 
arbitrary place in the universe? 
 
When this question is asked certain assumptions are naturally drawn together. 
Norton (1995) introduces various such assumptions as follows:
4
 
 
(a) Newton’s three laws of motion. 
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Muller and Gordon Belot concerning the consistency of classical electrodynamics in 
terms of their differing conceptions of ‘theory’. See also Wilson (2009), where three 
different conceptions of ‘Classical Mechanics’ are discussed. 
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(b) Newton’s inverse-square law of gravitational attraction. 
 
(b') Poisson’s equation with gravitational attraction described in terms of 
the potential φ. 
 
(c) Matter in the universe is distributed homogeneously (when viewed on 
a large enough scale) in an infinite Euclidean space. 
 
(d) There is a determinate net gravitational force on a test mass at any 
given time. 
 
(d') The gravitational potential φ is homogeneous. 
 
It turns out that the question (Q) can be answered in different, contradictory 
ways depending on which of the given assumptions are emphasised. There are 
essentially four different methods of reasoning which can be employed, which 
will be introduced in the forthcoming analysis in the following order: 
 
1. Use Newton’s law of gravitation 
2. Use Poisson’s equation 
3. Use symmetry considerations 
4. Use the gravitational potential 
 
Proceeding in this way means that we can investigate the inconsistencies 
without getting into the messy meta-ontology which accompanies such 
questions as ‘What is the theory?’ and ‘What is Newtonian cosmology?’ 
Asking such questions presumes a simplicity to the history of science which 
doesn’t exist.5 Instead the analysis can proceed in terms of the given question 
(Q), various methods of answering that question, and the assumptions which 
those methods draw upon. Any use of terms such as ‘theory’ and ‘Newtonian 
cosmology’ in what follows should be taken as shorthand for an analysis in 
terms of sets of assumptions. The connection between the given assumptions 
and the real history of science will be considered in §4. 
 
 
3. How was Newtonian cosmology inconsistent? 
 
Inconsistency, of course, means that a contradiction follows. When the noted 
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cosmology’ (Norton 1993) or ‘Newtonian gravitation theory’ (Norton 2002). 
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methods of reasoning provide contradictory answers to our question (Q) one of 
two principle kinds of contradiction results: 
 
(i) The net force on a test particle at a given time is both F and G 
where F≠G, or 
(ii) The net force on a test particle at a given time is both determinate 
(some vector quantity) and indeterminate (in a sense to be 
clarified). 
 
These will be tackled in §3.1 and §3.2 respectively. The precise inconsistency 
then depends on which of the given assumptions (a)-(d') the contradiction is 
said to follow from. Thus §3.1 and §3.2 are each split into further subsections. 
 
 
3.1  A contradiction of forces 
 
By ‘contradiction of forces’ I simply mean that the given assumptions can be 
used to derive the following contradiction: 
 
(C1) The force on a test mass is F and the force on a test mass is G, where 
F≠G. 
 
This splits into three different claims depending on which of the assumptions 
(a)-(d') are used to make the derivation. 
 
3.1.1  …using Newton’s law of gravitation? 
        
Norton’s original paper (1993) shows the first possible method of reasoning, 
and claims that we have a contradiction of forces from assumptions (a), (b) and 
(c): 
 
(a) Newton’s three laws of motion. 
(b) Newton’s law of gravitational attraction. 
(c) Matter in the universe is distributed homogeneously (when viewed on a 
large enough scale) in an infinite Euclidean space. 
 
In greater detail, by (b) we mean: 
 
(b) The force of gravity Fi on a test body mt at r due to another body mi at 
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ri is given by )(3 rr
rr
F 

 i
i
it
i
mm
G . 
 
This gives us the magnitude and direction of the force on our test mass mt due 
to one other mass mi. But in this paper we are asking what the net gravitational 
force is. By (c), since we are supposing the universe to be infinite and the mass 
distribution to be homogeneous, there will be an infinite number of masses. 
Further, (b) comes with no caveat that it doesn’t hold beyond a certain distance 
rr i . Thus we must infer that every mass in the universe has some effect 
(however small) on our test mass. Thus there are an infinite number of terms in 
our sum, and the net gravitational force is represented as the sum-total of all the 
contributory forces:  i inet FF .
6
 
At this point, since we are drawing on assumption (c), it is worth pausing to 
consider what is really meant by the homogeneity of the universe when viewed 
on a large enough scale. Of course nobody ever believed that the universe is 
totally homogeneous, but rather that if you take any arbitrary region of space R 
of a given large volume V then you will always find the same total amount of 
mass there (with small deviations from some mean value, which get smaller for 
volumes of space larger than V). This actually tells us next to nothing about the 
density of matter in the vicinity of a given test particle (it could be sat on the 
surface of a black hole, or be several hundred light years from the nearest 
massive particle). All we know is the total amount of matter in an arbitrary 
region of space R of volume V, which may include our particle. But this 
uncertainty in the local matter distribution doesn’t transfer to an uncertainty in 
the force on such a particle, at least insofar as Norton’s ‘lines of force 
argument’ (1993; 2002) is concerned. All the argument requires is the constant 
density of matter over different regions R at some scale (however big V has to 
be to achieve this constant density). 
Continuing Norton’s argument, from the infinite sum we can apparently get 
different answers depending on how we compute it.
7
 If we first consider a 
spherical region of the universe upon which our particle is sitting—of any 
given volume V or greater, and situated on any side of our particle—then we 
get a force F towards the centre of that sphere. It can then apparently be shown 
that the force due to all other masses amounts to nothing, since they can be 
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over all (continuous) points in Euclidean space, as in Malament (1995, p.491). This 
won’t be important here. 
7
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grouped into spherical shells, concentric with the centre of the original 
spherical region, each of which has no net effect on our particle. Thus our 
infinite sum turns into Fnet = F + 0 + 0 + 0 +... = F. But the size and direction of 
the original sphere, and thus the force F, was completely arbitrary. Thus Norton 
claims that the theory is ‘logically inconsistent in the traditional strict sense… 
[because] we can prove within the theory that the force on a test mass is both 
some nominated F and also not F, but some other force.’ (1993, p.413; 2002, 
p.186). 
In fact no such contradiction can be legitimately derived. Malament (1995) 
criticised the reasoning as follows: 
 
What Norton presents as an argument for inconsistency is better understood as 
just a vivid demonstration of non-convergence. (A perfect analogue of his 
argument might be used to “prove” that, for every integer n, the infinite sum    
1 – 1 + 1 – 1 + … is equal to n.) … Rather than asserting that Newtonian 
theory makes inconsistent determinations of gravitational force … Norton 
should have asserted that it makes no determination at all. (1995, p.491, 
original emphasis) 
 
In other words, Norton should have noted that not all infinite sums have an 
answer. For example, mathematicians in the late 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries 
rigorously debated whether the infinite sum 1-1+1-1+…, known as ‘Grandi’s 
series’, is equal to 1, 0, ½, or something else. Today, with the benefit of 
hindsight, we can look upon these struggles as mere historical curiosities, and 
say instead that since the series in question is not convergent it has no sum. The 
question is mathematically well-posed but has no answer, just as a question can 
be grammatically well posed and have no answer. 
The key failure of Norton’s argument can be seen by the fact that he groups 
together the effects of masses in certain regions of space in order to get a result. 
This is equivalent to bracketing together terms in Grandi’s series in order to get 
a result. But since this bracketing can be done in more than one way, if this 
were legitimate you could also show Grandi’s series to sum to two different 
values. The most obvious two are as follows: 
 
1...001...)11()11(1...1111
0...00...)11()11(...1111


 
 
So does Grandi’s series sum to both 0 and 1? Since this sort of bracketing is 
mathematically illegitimate, one must stop at the unbracketed series and 
conclude that it is equal to no value. 
These facts take on particular significance in the light of Norton’s 1999 
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derivation. He argues (p.274) that the infinite sum can be written as follows: 
 
...)11111(ˆ
...ˆˆˆˆˆ


x
xxxxxF
rG
rGrGrGrGrGnet


 
 
where xˆ  is a unit vector in any nominated direction. This time he considers 
hemispherical concentric shells, first on one side of the particle (in the direction 
of xˆ ) and then the other (in the direction of xˆ ), which build up to infinity. 
But the outstanding question is: why is this particular style of summation 
legitimate and the others not so? Hasn’t Norton once again illegitimately 
grouped together (in hemispheres) the effects of large numbers of masses to 
achieve his sum? Hasn’t he introduced brackets into the reasoning? 
This is true to some extent. The real infinite sum, without brackets, is a close 
approximation to a 3D version of Grandi’s series.8 Strictly speaking Norton 
shouldn’t group together the effects of large numbers of masses in 
hemispherical shells as he does in his 1999 paper. Crucially, however, this time 
the grouping does not affect the divergence of the summation. The introduction 
of his brackets is analogous to the following manipulation of Grandi’s series: 
 
...1111...)111()111()111(...1111   
 
In other words, the divergence of the sum is preserved by the bracketing. This 
is the achievement of Norton (1999). Thus although strictly speaking the 
infinite sum should not be set equal to k(1-1+1-1+…)—where k is the relevant 
constant vector—the indeterminate nature of the force Fnet is preserved by 
Norton’s 1999 analysis, whereas it isn’t preserved in his 1993 and 2002 
analyses. With Norton’s 1999 analysis we can be sure that the original series is 
divergent, because the re-ordering and bracketing of a convergent series would 
never leave us with a non-convergent series. 
A further point is in order here. Malament says that what Norton presents is a 
vivid demonstration of non-convergence. However, more specifically what 
Norton presents is a vivid demonstration of alternating non-convergence. Only 
when signs in a divergent series alternate is it possible to make quantities 
cancel out, and achieve various different finite answers through bracketing and 
re-ordering. Thus there is a sense in which alternating series don’t diverge, 
since ‘diverge’ usually means ‘diverge to infinity’. However you bracket and 
re-order an infinite series which diverges to infinity you get infinity (whether 
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positive or negative). Only with alternating series is it possible to achieve any 
number of finite answers for the sum of the series. To make this distinction 
clear, in what follows the word ‘indeterminate’ will be preferred over 
‘divergent’ to describe the sum of Grandi’s series. 
With this clarified we can still agree with Malament that assumptions (a), (b) 
and (c) make no determination of the net force. But this isn’t because the force 
is divergent, in the sense of ‘diverges to infinity’. If it were divergent then we 
could say that the assumptions predict an infinite force. Rather, it is because we 
reach a force balanced between convergence and divergence, an indeterminate 
force. Norton apparently accepts Malament’s criticism, since he is moved in his 
reply (1995) to add a further assumption to (a), (b) and (c), and introduce a 
somewhat different contradiction, an ‘indeterminacy contradiction’, as we’ll 
see in §3.2. 
 
3.1.2  …using Poisson’s equation? 
 
A second method of reasoning involves Poisson’s equation. Norton never 
suggests that we get a contradiction of forces using Poisson’s equation directly, 
but it will be useful later on to consider precisely why the theory isn’t 
inconsistent in this way. Fleshing out assumption (b') we have: 
 
(b') The force of gravity F on a body mt at r due to the mass distribution in 
a given volume V is given by )()( rrF  tm , where φ(r) is such 
that )(4)(2 rr  G , where G is a constant and where the 
gravitational potential φ(r) and the mass density ρ(r) are continuous 
scalar fields on V. 
 
To find the net force on a test mass we no longer need to sum up all the 
individual forces, but can simply derive the force from the potential field φ(r). 
From assumption (c) ρ is constant in space, so instead of ‘ρ(r)’ we can simply 
write ‘ρ’, with the added proviso (as we saw in the last section) that the density 
is only constant for regions of space of a given volume V or greater. Poisson’s 
equation then becomes  G4)(2  r , where φ(r) now refers to the 
gravitational potential at ‘points’ of space r which actually pick out regions R 
of volume V or greater. Since Poisson’s equation is a differential equation we 
need to integrate, and when you integrate you inevitably incur constants of 
integration. Thus the so-called ‘canonical solutions’ of Poisson’s equation are, 
 
2
0
3
2
)( rrr   G . 
 11 
 
Here r0 is the constant of integration.
9
 If we differentiate this equation to test 
whether it satisfies Poisson’s equation we get the right result 4πGρ whatever ro 
is, because it simply disappears during the calculation. 
We can now move to the force on our test mass using )()( rrF  tm . 
We find, 
 
)(
3
4
)( rrrF 0  Gmt . 
 
Once again, it should be emphasised that this really means the average force F 
in a large region of space R—picked out by r—of volume V or greater. We get 
a different value for this average force depending on how we choose r0, so we 
can get two different, contradictory average forces in the same region R by 
choosing r0 in two different ways. But it would be a gross error to go on to 
suppose that the theory is inconsistent for this reason. The theory just doesn’t 
tell us what r0 is, so we must leave it as an unknown constant. We certainly 
can’t just arbitrarily choose it to be two different things. To emphasise that the 
theory leaves us guessing we could write F=?, because r0=? (this will be useful 
for comparison later). 
 
3.1.3  …reasoning from symmetry 
 
Given the tools at our disposal we’ve thus-far seen two different ways of 
reasoning when faced with the question, ‘What is the net force on a given test 
particle?’ We can use Newton’s inverse-square law of gravitation or we can use 
Poisson’s equation. A third possible method of reasoning, and perhaps the most 
obvious (particularly to non-scientists), is to use symmetry considerations. 
There is an intuition that if the universe is really infinite and Euclidean, and 
has a homogeneous mass distribution (with the qualifications noted above), 
then it will be exactly the same vis-à-vis the average force on a test mass in any 
given region R.
10
 In other words, it is assumed that the average force cannot 
differ for any two such regions, since they are identical in the relevant respects. 
Of course this can’t follow from the cosmological assumptions (c) alone, since 
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 Norton (1995) calls these the ‘canonical solutions’, and distinguishes them from the 
most general solutions which include another constant of integration. This constant is 
quickly eliminated (see Norton 1995, p.513), and at any rate does not affect any 
argument here (see fn.12, below). 
10
 Focusing on regions rather than points of space obviates the need to account for local 
variations in the matter distribution, and allows us to compare the results of this method 
of reasoning directly with that which draws on Poisson’s equation, as seen below. 
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no reference is made to force there. From (c) it only follows that every ‘point’ 
of the universe is identical vis-à-vis the surrounding mass. So we need to add 
another assumption to change the intuition into a valid claim that every ‘point’ 
in the universe is identical vis-à-vis the gravitational force. 
The following assumption will do: 
 
(e) Gravitational force is caused by all mass and only mass. 
 
If gravitational force is caused by all and only mass, then the fact that every 
‘point’ in the universe is identical vis-à-vis the surrounding mass distribution 
will mean that every ‘point’ in the universe is identical vis-à-vis those factors 
relevant to the gravitational force. Which will mean that the average 
gravitational force is identical at every ‘point’ in the universe. It is often 
assumed that this means that the force must be everywhere zero. What reason, 
the argument goes, could there be for the force to point in one direction rather 
than another? This really needs an additional ‘no preferred direction’ 
assumption, which can be ignored for present purposes. All that is required to 
reach contradiction is that the force, whatever it is, doesn’t differ from ‘point’ 
to ‘point’. Following the discussion in §3.1.1, it should be noted that this is also 
consistent with the force being everywhere indeterminate.
11
 
We can now finally achieve a contradiction of forces by comparing this 
method of reasoning with the one seen in the previous section. From symmetry, 
drawing on assumptions (c) and (e), we have inferred either that F=k at every 
‘point’ r of the universe (for some 
3k ) or that F is everywhere 
indeterminate. Either way F will not differ from ‘point’ to ‘point’. But we saw 
in the previous section that we can draw on assumptions (b') and (c) to 
conclude that the average force at a given ‘point’ r will be 
 
)(
3
4
)( rrrF 0  Gmt . 
 
In order to satisfy Poisson’s equation  G4)(2  r , r0 must be some real 
vector quantity: 
3
0 r . But whatever vector quantity we choose we find that 
the force F will differ from one ‘point’ r to another r'. In fact whatever the 
choice of r0 we find that the average force on a test mass will be k, for any 
                                                 
11
 Malament (1995, pp.493 and 509) argues that a homogeneous mass distribution does 
not entail a homogeneous force field. However, this is only when one takes 
“gravitational force” to be a gauge quantity with no ‘direct physical significance’ (as 
Malament puts it). But before 1900 “gravitational force” certainly was presumed to 
have physical significance, so the entailment holds true for the purposes of this paper. 
 13 
given k, in exactly one region in the universe. And the difference between 
regions increases as the distance between the regions increases. Using this fact 
we reach the following contradiction, resulting from reasoning from (b'), (c) 
and (e) in two different ways: 
 
(C2) The average force on a test mass in any two arbitrary, widely spaced 
regions of the universe R and R' (of volume V or greater) will not differ (or 
differ by a negligible amount), and the average force on a test mass in any two 
arbitrary, widely spaced regions will differ significantly.
12
 
 
Although this is a contradiction, it is not immediately obvious what it means 
in empirical terms. We will not find the ‘force on a test particle’ F being, 
impossibly, both two different things at a single time (in other words we don’t 
get contradiction (C1)). Whereas the ‘force on a test particle’ is something we 
might say ‘exists’, the average force in a given region of space is a non-existent 
abstraction, just as the average family (with 2.4 children) is an abstraction. The 
real empirical difference here lies with the large scale movements of matter 
over time: with one story there are no large scale movements, whilst with the 
other there will be a large scale acceleration towards the ‘point’ r0. 
This is closely related to Norton’s so-called ‘inhomogeneity contradiction’, 
as introduced in his 1995 paper (p.514). However, instead of a contradiction of 
forces he introduces the contradiction, 
 
(C3) The gravitational potential φ is homogeneous and it is not the case that 
the gravitational potential φ is homogeneous. 
  
This is only achieved by introducing a new assumption: 
 
(d') The gravitational potential φ is homogeneous. 
 
Unlike the other assumptions used so far, commitment to (d') by scientists is 
dubious. φ isn’t a physical thing after all, but is just a mathematical tool which 
                                                 
12
 Einstein provided a possible way forward here. He found that he could make things 
work by altering Poisson’s equation to  G42  , so that a constant 
solution for φ is possible: φ=-4πGρ/λ (he found that no such solution is possible with 
the normal version of the equation, even if one draws on the most general solutions—
see fn.9, above). This then gives an average force of F=0 everywhere, consistent with 
symmetry considerations. See Norton (1999) for this and other ways in which the 
assumptions can be modified to avoid the problems. 
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intermediates between the ‘real’ masses and forces.13 The suggestion seems to 
be that (d') follows from the homogeneity of the mass distribution, but this is to 
mix up the physical and the mathematical. The argument is surely that since the 
universe’s mass distribution is symmetrical the universe cannot differ from 
region to region in certain physical respects. The latter include the (physical) 
force, but not the (unphysical) potential. 
Here it is better to turn to Malament (1995, p.492), who frames the difficulty 
in terms of the homogeneity of the force field. Thus a slightly different 
contradiction is suggested: 
 
(C4) The gravitational field f is homogeneous and it is not the case that the 
gravitational field f is homogeneous. 
 
where f stands for f(r), the force per unit mass at r. This is closely related to 
(C2), but differs from it in two respects which are worth noting. First, 
Malament has left out the fact that f must stand for the average value of the 
force field in large regions (thus (C4) makes things seem simpler than they 
really are). However, this isn’t really a difference since Malament has simply 
left it implicit. A more substantial difference comes in the fact that Malament 
does not allow for the fact that a force everywhere indeterminate is compatible 
with symmetry constraints (unless, somewhat implausibly, he intends this 
possibility to be covered by the word ‘homogeneous’). In other words one can 
only reach Malament’s contradiction (C4) by drawing on an extra assumption, 
assumption (d), which blocks the possible indeterminacy of the force. But the 
present analysis shows that drawing on this extra assumption is not necessary to 
reach contradiction. Leaving assumption (d) aside, from symmetry it follows 
that if such a force field exists then it is homogeneous. Poisson’s equation then 
brings contradiction by telling us that such a force field does exist, and that it is 
inhomogeneous, which affirms the antecedent and denies the consequent of our 
conditional. 
Summing up, what I have shown is that we do get a genuine contradiction of 
forces (C2) from (b'), (c) and (e). In fact we might even say that we reach the 
contradiction by (b') and (c) alone, since it might be argued that (e) is 
embedded within (b'). However, this doesn’t affect the main point here: the 
challenge isn’t to find inconsistency in as few assumptions as possible, but to 
find inconsistency in assumptions which probably were committed to, in the 
relevant historical period, as serious candidates for the truth. There can be little 
doubt that assumptions (b'), (c) and (e) meet this criterion (see §4 for more on 
                                                 
13
 The potential was introduced by Laplace in the 1770s, and was considered a mere 
computational tool from the very beginning (see Cat 2001, p.402ff. and Grattan-
Guinness 1990, p.332). 
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this point). 
 
 
3.2  An indeterminacy contradiction 
 
The contradiction of concern in this section will be, 
 
(C5) There is a unique gravitational force on a test mass and it’s not the case 
that there is a unique gravitational force on a test mass. 
 
This isn’t quite the contradiction Norton presents in his 1995 paper, but it is 
surely what he means to present. It is worth pausing to clarify things here, since 
he doesn’t correct his mistake in his 1999 and 2002 papers. 
Norton responds to Malament’s objections (as seen above in §3.1.1) in his 
1995 paper. He accepts that there is no contradiction of forces after all, and 
instead brings to our attention what he calls an ‘indeterminacy contradiction’. 
On p.513 he adds the following assumption to (a), (b) and (c): 
 
(d*) There is a unique gravitational force on a test mass fixed by (b) and (c). 
 
Now, since Malament is right about the non-convergence of the sum, one 
cannot derive a unique gravitational force on a test mass from (b) and (c). Thus 
it might be supposed that we have a contradiction here: 
 
(C6) There is a unique gravitational force on a test mass fixed by (b) and (c) 
and it’s not the case that there is a unique gravitational force on a test mass 
fixed by (b) and (c). 
 
But on closer inspection we don’t have this contradiction after all. If we accept 
Norton’s (d*) we have, 
 
(a) Newton’s three laws of motion. 
(b) Newton’s inverse square law of gravitation. 
(c) Matter is distributed homogeneously and isotropically (when viewed 
on a large enough scale) in an infinite Euclidean space. 
(d*)   There is a unique gravitational force on a test mass fixed by (b) and 
(c). 
 
(d*) gives us the positive contradictory of (C6), so it only matters that we can 
derive the negative contradictory. However, even if it follows from (b) and (c) 
that, 
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It’s not the case that there is a unique gravitational force on a test mass. 
 
this isn’t the contradictory we want. To establish (C6) we need to add ‘…fixed 
by (b) and (c)’ on the end. But since the assumptions in question don’t refer to 
‘(b)’ and ‘(c)’ at all this is an impossible task. (C6) can’t be derived from (a)-
(d*) after all. 
It is clear what has happened here. In specifying (d*) Norton has accidentally 
mixed up the theory and the meta-theory. He actually meant to add, 
 
(d)  There is a unique gravitational force on a test mass 
 
which leads to contradiction (C5), as we will see in the next section. 
 
3.2.1  …using Newton’s law of gravitation 
 
We saw in §3.1.1 that, as Malament claims, assumptions (a), (b) and (c) tell us 
that the net force on a given test mass is undetermined. But (d) tells us that the 
net force on a test mass is determined. And the introduction of (d) should not be 
dismissed as the ad hoc introduction of the required contradictory. In fact, the 
introduction of (d) is merely the explicit mention of an assumption which is 
already an integral part of Newton’s three laws (a). Take Newton’s first law, 
for example. In its original form it states, ‘Every body perseveres in its state of 
being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward, except as it is compelled 
to change its state by force impressed.’ This is equivalent to ‘a body is either at 
rest or moving in a straight line, or accelerating due to an impressed force’. 
These are the only options, so a body is either experiencing a force 
(accelerating) or it is not (straight line motion, or rest). In other words, there is 
always a determinate force on a body, whether it be something or nothing. Thus 
the introduction of (d) is not the introduction of a new assumption at all, but is 
part and parcel of (a). Thus the indeterminacy contradiction (C5) is meant to 
follow from (a), (b) and (c). 
There is an important distinction to make here. Certainly from (b) and (c) we 
end up with an infinite sum which is indeterminate, from which we cannot 
achieve an answer to the question ‘what is the force?’ But can we conclude 
from here that there is no unique gravitational force on a test mass? That is, we 
have failed using (b) and (c) to determine what the force is. But couldn’t it still 
be the case that there is some unique force, and that we could determine what it 
is by another method, using different reasoning or bringing in other 
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considerations?
14
 This is crucial, because if we cannot make the further 
assumption that no force exists then we cannot get to the negative contradictory 
in question, and the inconsistency claim falls down. 
The two possible inferences can be distinguished as follows: 
 
(I)    from indeterminacy infer that no solution has been reached. 
(I*)  from indeterminacy infer that there is no solution. 
 
If one makes the weaker inference (I) then the reasoning continues as follows. 
The fact that we can’t figure out what the force is from (b) and (c) can be 
represented by a question mark (cf. §3.1.2, above): 
 

)(),(),(
?
Icb
i i F  
 
On this understanding, all options are still open—there might be some other 
way to determine what the unique force on a test mass is. There is then no 
contradiction with (d). We might formalise (d) thus: 
 
  
)(
3 ,
d
netFkk  . 
 
In other words, there exists some vector quantity which equals the net force on 
a test particle.
15
 If we believe that (b) Newton’s law of gravity holds then we 
can add, 
 

)(b
i inet  FF . 
 
Placing these beside each other we have, 
 
  
)(
3 ,
d
netFkk     
)(b
i inet  FF    
)(),(),(
?
Icb
i i F  
 
Now, by substitutivity of identicals, we can fill in the question mark and write: 
                                                 
14
 This is suggested by Norton’s introduction of (d*). (d*) says that there is no force 
fixed by (b) and (c), not that there is no force. 
15
 Of course before the introduction of ‘real numbers’ and the like physicists would 
have talked vaguely about ‘quantities’, but that doesn’t affect the argument at hand. 
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  
)(),(),(
3 ,
dcb
i i Fkk  
 
There is no contradiction here. We couldn’t find an answer to our indeterminate 
sum using (b) and (c), but there is some answer, yet to be discovered. 
Today, two centuries of mathematics tells us that this is the wrong way to 
think about indeterminate sums. Not only do we get no answer when we are 
faced with an indeterminate sum, we find that there is no answer, there cannot 
be an answer, as stated by (I*).
16
 As far as the sum of gravitational forces goes, 
this means that, 
 
  
*)(
3 ,
I
i i  lFl . 
 
With this in place we really do have our contradiction. We now have the 
following three equalities: 
 
  
)(
3 ,
d
netFkk     
)(b
i inet  FF      
*)(),(),(
3 ,
Icb
i i  lFl  
 
From the substitutivity of identicals we can then write, 
 
lklk  ,, 33  
 
To be logically rigorous, we could now perform existential and universal 
instantiation to reach the conclusion a≠a. In other words it follows that some 
three-vector a is not equal to itself, a blatant contradiction. 
Thus the inference we make when faced with an indeterminate sum decides 
whether we derive a contradiction or not. As we will see further in §4.2, the 
force of inference (I*) can be easy to overlook, and has been overlooked by 
several authors both in the distant and recent past. In fact what (I*) tells us is 
that absolute forces in the universe do not exist (that our metaphysics is 
                                                 
16
 Cauchy wrote in 1821, ‘a divergent series does not have a sum’. However, in this 
paper I am assuming only that alternating divergent series do not have a sum. The 
reason is that, if we are talking physics (rather than mathematics) we cannot infer that a 
quantity which ‘diverges to infinity’ is equal to nothing. Infinity counts as ‘something’ 
here. 
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wrong).
17
 The point is that one must have assumed that absolute forces exist in 
order to ask the question ‘What is the net force on a test particle?’ But then 
when we employ (I*) we find that absolute forces do not exist, contradicting 
the assumed metaphysics. So when one reaches indeterminacy in the way seen 
here it is really just another way of reaching contradiction. This puts some meat 
on the bones of Malament’s suggested distinction (1995, p.489) between the 
theory being inconsistent and the theory being ‘unacceptable a priori’ (because 
of indeterminacy): the latter is a special case of the former. 
 
3.2.2  …from summing the potential φ 
 
There is one final method of reasoning we have not yet considered, and there is 
something of a tradition of using it to demonstrate the failures of the theory. 
The gravitational potential at a point r due to a given mass mi at ri can be 
expressed thus: 
 
     
rr
r


i
i
i
m
G)(     (Eq.1) 
 
The net gravitational potential at a point will then be )()( rr iinet   . This 
then gives rise to a new assumption about forces in the universe: 
 
(f) The net force of gravity Fnet on a body mt at r is given by 
)()( rrF nettnet m  , where φnet is achieved by summing the 
gravitational potential (Eq.1). 
 
But the problem with this method of reasoning is that the net gravitational 
potential is everywhere infinite: whereas the components of force on two 
opposite sides of a test mass, being vector quantities, cancel each other out (to 
one degree or another), the components of potential, being scalar quantities, 
accumulate. This time not only does the sum diverge to infinity, but it diverges 
to infinity relatively quickly because the potential is a 1/r relationship, whereas 
masses in the universe increase with r
2
.
18
 
                                                 
17
 This is the conclusion of Norton’s 1995 paper (see especially p.515). Note the subtle 
difference between saying that there are no forces (i.e. F=0 everywhere) and saying that 
absolute forces don’t exist. In the latter case ‘F’ doesn’t refer, so it can’t equal 
anything. 
18
 Cf. Norton 1999, p.273. Grandi’s series arises in the context of Newtonian 
cosmology for the force because the force is a 1/r
2
 relationship and masses in the 
universe increase with r
2
, thus cancelling each other out. 
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What should we conclude from the fact that the potential diverges to infinity 
at every point? As noted in §3.1.3, the potential is merely a mathematical tool, 
used to mediate between physical masses and forces. If there is trouble in an 
infinite potential, that should only be in the fact that the physical consequences 
are unpalatable. Now, as stated, to reach the force on a test mass mt from the 
potential we need to take its gradient: )()( rrF  tm . But if φ is infinite 
everywhere this operation isn’t possible, because it is not defined for infinity. 
One cannot proceed to derive F(r)=0, reasoning that φ(r) is everywhere 
constant. ‘Constant’ refers to numerical constancy, and infinity is not a number. 
Thus, I suggest, not only do we find that we don’t know what F is in this case, 
we find that F is indeterminate. Thus summing the potential is consistent with 
summing the force directly using Newton’s law of gravity (b), as in §3.2.1. So 
this is really just the same problem of indeterminacy in a different guise. 
There have been several related discussions, but nowhere has the problem 
been identified with indeterminacy. Jaki (1969) writes of a ‘gravitational 
version of Olbers’ paradox’ where in the latter case, in an infinite, 
homogeneous universe, the light from distant stars accumulates to give an 
infinite amount of light at any point.
19
 In the gravitational case Jaki (1979) 
writes, 
 
An infinite universe of homogeneously distributed stars or galaxies cannot 
exist because in such a universe the gravitational potential is infinite at any 
point. (p.121) 
 
But unlike light the potential is a non-physical thing. Nowhere do we find a 
discussion of exactly why an infinite potential is impossible; nowhere is there a 
discussion of indeterminacy. And those whom Jaki draws on apparently think 
that the theory demands genuinely infinite forces. In particular, Jaki draws at 
length on Einstein (1917), who argues as follows: 
 
According to the theory of Newton, the number of “lines of force” which come 
from infinity and terminate in a mass m is proportional to the mass m. If, on the 
average, the mass-density ρ0 is constant throughout the universe, then a sphere 
of volume V will enclose the average mass ρ0V. Thus the number of lines of 
force passing through the surface F of the sphere into its interior is proportional 
to ρ0V. For unit area of the surface of the sphere the number of lines of force 
which enters the sphere is thus proportional to 
F
V
0  or to ρ0R. Hence the 
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 Olbers, in 1823, derived that the light at any point in the universe would be equal to 
k(1+1+1+1+…) for a given constant k (see Jaki 1969, p.134f.). Clearly this is not 
indeterminate: it diverges to infinity. 
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intensity of the field at the surface would ultimately become infinite with 
increasing radius R of the sphere, which is impossible. (Einstein 1917, p.106) 
 
This is worth quoting in full, because to my knowledge it has not yet been 
made clear that this reasoning is seriously incomplete. How are the final words 
‘which is impossible’ warranted? Rather than focusing on the potential φ he is 
here focused on the force field f, the force per unit volume at a point. It is 
certainly true that, in our infinite universe, there will be an infinite component 
of f in a given direction, but what is so impossible about this? The impossibility 
only comes when we consider the combined effect of all such infinite 
components and find that the result is indeterminate, as in §3.2.1, above. The 
impossibility does not lie simply in the absurdity of an ‘infinite force field’, as 
Einstein suggests. 
The supposition that it is possible to derive infinite forces is not unique to 
Einstein. Seeliger, who finally shed light on the problems with Newtonian 
cosmology in 1895, supposes that there are infinite forces in a follow-up paper 
of 1896. He writes, ‘It follows from potential theory that there must be in the 
universe unlimited (infinitely) great accelerations.’ (cited in Norton 1999, 
p.279, emphasis in original). But this simply isn’t the case. Once again, all that 
is shown is that there will be an infinite component of force in a given 
direction, or that the potential will sum to infinity. Kelvin is similarly unclear 
in 1901 (see Norton 1999, p.285). 
In summary, we do get a contradiction here from summing the potential, and 
it is once again the indeterminacy contradiction (C5). This time we reach the 
conclusion because the gradient of a scalar field which is everywhere infinite is 
indeterminate just as the sum of an alternating divergent series is indeterminate. 
So what we have here is not a ‘qualitatively different’ type of problem, as 
Norton claims (1999, p.279), but just a different way of reaching the same 
conclusion. 
 
3.2.3  …using Poisson’s equation 
 
Norton claims that the indeterminacy contradiction (C5) also follows from 
applying Poisson’s equation: 
 
The addition of the potential φ and Poisson equation does not materially affect 
the indeterminacy contradiction of Newtonian cosmology. There are as many 
canonical solutions as there are choices for r0. Each distinct choice of r0 leads 
to a different force on the test body. (1995, p.514) 
 
So Norton is claiming that indeterminacy follows from the fact that, depending 
on how we pick the constant of integration, we get a different result for the 
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force. So no unique force follows from the theory, just as no unique force 
followed when we had an infinite sum in §3.2.1. But here as before we need to 
make a distinction between no unique force following from the theory and there 
being no unique force at all. In §3.2.1 this was expressed as two ‘strengths of 
inference’ (I) and (I*). With Poisson’s formulation we get an analogous pair of 
inferences: 
 
(II) From an unknown constant of integration infer that the theory provides 
no unique solution. 
(II*) From an unknown constant of integration infer that there is no unique 
solution. 
 
But this time only the weaker inference (II) is legitimate. This is because the 
reason why one cannot infer two contradictory forces is different. Recall that in 
§3.1.1 we couldn’t infer two contradictory forces because there cannot be a 
solution to an indeterminate sum. But in §3.1.2 we couldn’t infer contradictory 
forces because, although there certainly can be a solution to an equation with 
an unknown constant, the theory couldn’t tell us what it was. Since we cannot 
make the stronger inference we cannot reach the contradictory in question and, 
contra Norton, there is no indeterminacy contradiction here. 
However, when we compare the method of reasoning based on Poisson’s 
equation (b') and that based on Newton’s law of gravitation (b) we do find a 
conflict. We saw above that if one applies (b) to an infinite homogeneous 
universe, one infers that the force is indeterminate. But, as seen in §3.1.2, using 
Poisson’s equation instead we can move from  G4)(2  r  to 
 
2
0
3
2
)( rrr   G , 
 
where r0 must be some real number (it cannot be indeterminate since then it 
would not be a solution to Poisson’s equation). And from here, using 
)()( rrF  tm , since one has a determinate potential one has a determinate 
force. So from (b), (b') and (c) we can infer the indeterminacy contradiction 
(C5) once again, where this time the determinacy of the force follows from (b'). 
This seems to go against Malament (1995). He seems to claim that (b') is 
actually a generalisation of (b) because when the infinite sum in question 
converges (b) and (b') agree, whereas (b') can also be applied when the sum 
doesn’t converge. He writes,  
 
There is a clear sense in which it [the “differential” formulation] is a 
generalization, with a wider domain of application… The “integral” 
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formulation is not applicable to cosmological contexts of the sort we have 
considered. (pp. 491 and 508) 
 
But if (b') were a generalisation of (b) then they would not be in conflict. And 
they are in conflict, as I have argued above. 
However, it turns out that what Malament calls the ‘integral formulation’ and 
the ‘differential formulation’ are not quite the same as (b) and (b'). They are the 
same except for one crucial interpretational difference: gravitational force is 
taken to be a gauge quantity without direct physical significance. But (b) and 
(b') were around long before this 20
th
 century attitude to ‘gravitational force’. 
Before 1900 (b') was not a generalisation of (b), and they were in fact in 
conflict. Thus Malament’s analysis and the above analysis can stand side by 
side: one need only note that Malament is concerned with 20
th
 century 
developments of Newtonian cosmology, and this paper is not.
20
  
 
 
4. Why weren’t the inconsistencies noticed? 
 
In all this we find four notable inconsistencies: 
 
(I1) C2 follows from (b'), (c) and (e). (§3.1.3) 
(I2) C5 follows from (b), (c) and (d). (§3.2.1) 
(I3) C5 follows from (c), (d) and (f). (§3.2.2) 
(I4) C5 follows from (b), (b') and (c). (§3.2.3) 
 
In a sense, then, Newtonian cosmology was riddled with inconsistency. Further, 
the assumptions in question are clearly relevant to the real history of science to 
some degree or another. This paper is not the place for a detailed history, but 
Jaki’s history of Olbers’ paradox (Jaki 1969) is a good place to start. Each of 
the assumptions in question enjoyed serious commitment for the relevant 
periods in between the years 1700 and 1900, and most were widely regarded as 
obvious truths.
21
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 I doubt Malament would also claim that (b), like the ‘integral formulation’, ‘is not 
applicable to cosmological contexts of the sort we have considered’ (that is, when the 
sum does not converge). As has been shown above, one certainly can apply (b) in such 
a context, with the result that the force on a test mass is indeterminate. To maintain that 
this means that (b) is inapplicable would be to use one’s assumptions like a ‘toolbox’, 
where one picks and chooses one’s assumptions depending on whether they lead to 
desirable results. Certainly some scientific practice proceeds in this way, but only when 
the assumptions one trades in are not being considered as candidates for truth. 
21
 Perhaps this is less obvious regarding assumption (c), and there were some who 
doubted either the infinitude of the universe or its homogeneity, but the majority were 
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Thus the question of why the inconsistencies remained hidden for so long is 
more important than ever. This brings us back to questions (i) and (ii) 
introduced in §1: 
 
(i) What was it about the scientific community which prevented the 
inconsistencies from being noticed? 
(ii) What was it about the science which prevented the inconsistencies 
from being noticed? 
 
In particular the content of the present paper enables us to provide an answer to 
question (ii). In addition, in §4.1, some relevant features of the scientific 
community are introduced to provide the beginnings of an answer to question 
(i). 
4.1  Because the right question wasn’t asked 
 
There are a multitude of reasons why the question which leads to the 
inconsistencies wasn’t asked. The above analysis highlights one reason in 
particular: the relevant question is actually rather obscure. This is made obvious 
by the contradiction of forces (C2) of §3.1.3. We are not asking what the actual 
force on a given body is: to answer this one would need to know, absurdly, the 
positions and masses of an infinite number of bodies. Rather, our question (Q) 
needs to be changed to, 
 
(Q') What is the average net gravitational force a test body would experience 
over all points of an arbitrary region of the universe R of a given volume V 
large enough so that the universe is homogeneous at that scale? 
 
This could also be framed in terms of the force field f, as per Malament 
(§3.1.3), but still we would not get away from the complications of averaging. 
And, complications aside, it isn’t immediately clear why this question is an 
interesting one, except that answering it in two different ways leads to 
inconsistency. 
So even if relevant individuals had been asking pertinent cosmological 
questions there is some reason to suppose that the question at issue wouldn’t 
have been asked. But the fact is that, particularly in the 19
th
 century, the 
relevant individuals weren’t asking cosmological questions at all. Merleau-
Ponty (1977, p.283) refers to ‘the disappearance of cosmological science as 
                                                                                                                      
convinced. For example, Bertrand Russell was convinced enough to write as late as 
1897 that the infinitude and homogeneity of the universe, far from being working 
hypotheses (say), were scientific principles ‘established forever’ (as Jaki (1969, pp.184 
and 220) puts it). 
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such in the nineteenth century, that is, the investigation of the properties of the 
Universe considered in its totality—until its surprising revival in the twentieth 
century.’ It is this ‘revival’ which explains the title of his book of 1976 (co-
written with Morando): The Rebirth of Cosmology. Therein he goes as far as to 
say that, in the 19
th
 century, ‘cosmology itself no longer existed’ (p.66). 
This is a remarkable claim, since there was certainly much work in 
astronomy and celestial mechanics during this period. But, regarding the 
former, ‘in the course of the [19th] century astronomers were discussing the 
nature and internal structure of individual nebulae rather than the wider 
cosmological problem.’ (North 1965, p.16. Cf. Jaki 1979, p.117 and Merleau-
Ponty 1977, p.291). Similarly those working in celestial mechanics, such as 
Poisson himself, avoided cosmology entirely. For example Laplace, one of the 
founding fathers of celestial mechanics and active in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 
centuries, never made even a single conjecture as to the structure of the 
universe as a whole (Merleau-Ponty 1977, p.283; Jaki 1969, p.98). And later in 
the 19
th
 century, as Jaki puts it, ‘The silence of Urbain J. J. Leverrier, the most 
celebrated French astronomer of those times… illustrated the typical aversion 
to cosmological problems on the part of most skilful experts on celestial 
mechanics.’ (1969, p.157). 
In the light of such facts we may consider afresh the question ‘Was 
Newtonian cosmology inconsistent?’ In the 19th century the answer should 
really be neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’; rather there is a mistake in the question, since 
Newtonian cosmology did not exist in this period in any meaningful sense. In 
the terms of §2, above, we may say that the relevant assumptions were not 
brought together scientifically because cosmological questions were not being 
asked which would have required them to be brought together. This is of 
course especially relevant to inconsistencies (I1) and (I4), since they both draw 
on Poisson’s equation which was only introduced in 1813. And (I3), which 
depends on potential theory, is similarly mainly relevant to the 19
th
 century 
(recall that Laplace introduced the potential in the 1770s). 
 
 
4.2  Because of confusion about non-convergent series 
 
Before the 19
th
 century there is more interest in questions of cosmology, but 
before the 19
th
 century is before Cauchy. Since inconsistencies (I2), (I3) and 
(I4) lead to the indeterminacy contradiction (C5), appreciating them depends on 
making the right inference when faced with a non-convergent series. Thus there 
is some reason to suppose that a lack of understanding of the relevant 
mathematics contributed to the inconsistency going unnoticed. In general terms 
we may say that one of the inferences necessary for the derivation of the 
contradiction was a peculiar type of inference, alien to the relevant individuals. 
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More specifically, I will provide some evidence in this section that certain 
individuals made inference (I) rather than inference (I*), as introduced in 
§3.2.1, and repeated here for convenience: 
 
(I)    from indeterminacy infer that no solution has been reached. 
(I*)  from indeterminacy infer that there is no solution. 
 
This will also constitute my preferred explanation of the attitudes of those—
Isaac Newton and Svante Arrhenius—who according to Norton favour a ‘no-
solution needed’ solution to the inconsistency. He characterises this attitude as 
follows: 
 
They are aware of the inconsistency but ignore the possibility of deriving 
results that contradict those that seem appropriate… At first glance, it would 
seem that the physical theorists avoid logical anarchy by the simple 
expedient of ignoring it! (2002, p.191) 
 
Instead I claim that they weren’t aware of the inconsistency after all, because 
they only made inference (I)—‘no solution reached’—and not (I*)—‘no 
solution possible’. To decide between Norton’s claims and my own a look at 
the primary evidence is required. 
First to Newton. Was he aware of the inconsistency and chose just to ignore 
it, as Norton claims? In fact, although Norton does describe Newton as 
subscribing to a ‘no-solution solution’ in his 2002 paper, in his historically 
focused 1999 paper he suggests instead that Newton wasn’t aware of the 
inconsistency. When the theologian Richard Bentley pressed Newton on the 
gravitational consequences of an infinite universe in 1692, Newton referred to 
how mathematicians handle infinities in terms of limits and convergence. Thus 
Norton concludes, 
 
Having recalled for us that there are perfectly good methods of comparing 
infinites by means of limits, Newton seemed not to have applied them himself 
to the problem at hand… It is hard to understand how Newton could make such 
a mistake. His mathematical and geometric powers are legendary. Perhaps 
Newton was so sure of his incorrect result from the symmetry considerations 
that he did not deem it worthwhile the few moments reflection needed to see 
through to a final result. (1999, p.290f.) 
 
This story goes against the ‘no-solution solution’ as described in his 2002 
paper. He further writes that Newton ‘would surely have noticed’ that there was 
an inconsistency if only he had applied the relevant mathematics. So it is not 
the case, then, that Newton noticed the inconsistency but chose to ignore it, as 
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per the ‘no-solution solution’. 
This suggests that we read Norton in another way. In sum he appears to be 
saying that either (i) Newton didn’t apply the relevant mathematics and so 
didn’t notice the indeterminacy, or (ii)—the ‘no-solution solution’—Newton 
did apply the relevant mathematics, noticed the indeterminacy, and chose to 
ignore it. 
This paper can offer an alternative explanation. The fact that Newton is clear 
on how to handle converging infinite series is actually irrelevant insofar as 
Newtonian cosmology is concerned. The relevant series is infinite and 
diverging, so Newton couldn’t have applied the methods of limits to the 
problem at hand (as Norton suggests). And in fact Newton’s grasp on divergent 
series, and alternating divergent series in particular, was not good. In his most 
in-depth writings on infinite series
22—an unpublished essay from 1684 entitled 
‘On the computation of series’—Newton blatantly overlooks the fact that a 
divergent alternating series has no sum. Following one particular passage 
Whiteside’s annotation reads, 
 
He has, however, ignored the unpleasant fact that no unique sum is assignable 
to a divergent alternating series. (Newton 1971, p.611) 
 
I take it that Whiteside is using the word ‘ignore’ in a loose sense here, and 
doesn’t mean to suggest that Newton saw the correct conclusion but decided to 
ignore it. Newton was not in the habit of ignoring what he knew to be correct 
conclusions. 
In sum, then, a ‘third way’ seems a more plausible explanation of Newton’s 
attitude than either of Norton’s suggestions. This is to suppose that Newton did 
make the calculation in question, but upon coming across an alternating, 
divergent series made inference (I)—no solution reached—rather than 
inference (I*)—no solution possible. Since he found no solution, but didn’t 
conclude that there was no solution, he tried a different tack. As Norton notes, 
‘symmetry considerations’ guided him, and he concluded that the average net 
force must be zero (cf. §3.1.3, above).
23
 The infinities must balance after all, 
although apparently mathematics isn’t up to the task of showing us this. 
To give a second example, Norton writes that Arrhenius ‘laid out a clear 
statement of the ‘no-solution solution’.’ Arrhenius wrote in 1909, 
 
[I]t is very much understandable that Seeliger’s argumentation is frequently 
construed as conflicting with the infinity of the world. This, however, is not 
true. The difficulty lies in that the attraction of a body surrounded by infinitely 
                                                 
22
 See Whiteside’s annotation in Newton 1981, p.267. 
23
 Jaki (1969, pp.60-65) gives a nice discussion. 
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many bodies is undetermined according to Seeliger’s way of calculation and 
can take on all possible values. This, however, only proves that one cannot 
carry out the calculation by this method. (cited in Norton 1999, p.291, 
emphasis added) 
 
Certainly Arrhenius did not think that there was an inconsistency, as Norton 
suggests. The confusion here seems to rest with what Arrhenius means by 
‘cannot’. As Norton interprets it, when Arrhenius says that ‘one cannot carry 
out the calculation by this method’ he means that, although mathematically 
sound, one must avoid that method of calculation because it leads to 
contradiction. This, however, leaves inexplicable why Arrhenius thinks there is 
no conflict. Things make more sense if we read ‘one cannot carry out the 
calculation by this method’ more literally. Arrhenius means that one just 
doesn’t get an answer that way—one does not reach a solution by this 
method—because the sum in question is indeterminate. But this means that 
there still may be an answer, and he suggests zero (based, again, on symmetry 
considerations). His mistake is in not making as strong an inference as he ought 
to make when faced with non-convergence (he makes inference (I) instead of 
(I*)). This is a mistake, but it is not the mistake Norton takes it to be. 
Even as late as 1954 Layzer, criticizing Milne and McCrea’s neo-Newtonian 
cosmology of the 1930s, made this same oversight and claimed that we should 
infer that F=0 everywhere (Layzer 1954, p.269). McCrea put things straight the 
following year: 
 
[I]f the gravitational force is to be defined in the present manner, then it does 
not exist in the case of uniform density. Accordingly, nothing further can be 
inferred about this case. In particular, we may not proceed to argue, as Layzer 
does, that the force must be the same at every point, and thence that it must be 
zero. For, in order to prove that a force takes any value, in particular the value 
zero, the force has to exist in the mathematical sense. (1955, p.273, emphasis 
added) 
 
What he surely means by the final remark is that, if the force really is equal to 
an indeterminate sum, then it can take no value, including zero. 
Still other authors who clearly do understand non-convergence very well 
aren’t sufficiently careful with their words to make the distinction between the 
force being zero (it is determined) and the force not existing (it isn’t 
determined). Even parts of Malament (1995) are unclear on this point. In his 
criticism of Norton (1993) he writes, 
 
The integral I is not convergent, and so it is not the case that I = I1 + I2 + I3 +… 
[…] Newtonian theory … makes no determination [of gravitational force] at 
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all. (p.491, original emphasis) 
 
Here we have two clear statements of the weaker of our two inferences (I). The 
stronger inference (I*) would state not only that Malament’s integral ‘I’ is not 
equal to I1 + I2 + I3 +… but that it is equal to no quantity whatsoever. And it 
would state not only that Newtonian theory makes no determination of the net 
gravitational force, but that Newtonian theory states that the net gravitational 
force cannot be any quantity. Compare this with §3.1.2, where Poisson’s 
equation makes no determination of the net gravitational force (because we are 
left with unknown constants of integration), but nevertheless demands that it is 
some quantity.
24
 
This subtle distinction between no force being found and no force being 
possible (even zero) is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to confusion 
about divergent series in the relevant period, especially in the 18
th
 century. 
Euler and others set the sums of divergent series equal to certain quantities 
right through the 18
th
 century, and were able to reach startling correct 
conclusions by manipulating them (see Hardy 1949, ch.1). That is, setting 
divergent summations equal to certain values proved to be extremely fruitful. In 
addition, as Hardy explains, ‘there is only one sum which it is ‘reasonable’ to 
assign to a divergent series: thus all ‘natural’ calculation with the series [1-1+1-
1+…] seems to point to the conclusion that its sum should be taken to be ½’ 
(Ibid., p.6). Apart from the fact that ½ is the mean of 1 and 0, there were some 
very persuasive reasons to set Grandi’s series equal to ½. For example if we set 
 
S = 1-1+1-1+1-1+…. 
 
then we might conclude that, 
 
1-S = 1-(1-1+1-1+1-…) = 1-1+1-1+1-… = S. 
 
This would mean that 1=2S, or that S=1/2. Another method was to consider the 
binomial expansion (discovered by Newton in the 1660s), 
 
...1
1
1 32 

xxx
x
. 
 
This was known to converge for all x such that 0≤x<1. But if it holds for all 
                                                 
24
 Further, Malament’s statement that Newton’s law of gravitation is ‘not applicable’ 
when the series in question doesn’t converge (see §3.2.3, above) also suggests the 
weaker inference (I). And recall also Norton’s introduction of assumption (d*), rather 
than (d), which strongly suggests the same. 
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such x then in the limit at x goes to 1 we find that, 
 
...1111
2
1
  
 
This latter method had already been recommended by Leibniz and was still 
popular one hundred years later, in the early 19
th
 century. Poisson himself 
favoured this reasoning, despite living in the time of Cauchy’s groundbreaking 
Cours d’Analyse of 1821, and he ‘retained this staple component of his analysis 
throughout his life’ (Grattan-Guinness 1970, p.88; see also Laugwitz 1989, 
p.218ff.). In fact, Grattan-Guinness claims that when Cauchy wrote in italics ‘a 
divergent series has no sum’ it was partly aimed at Poisson (Ibid.).25 And even 
as late as 1844 De Morgan still failed to appreciate that Grandi’s series did not 
sum to ½ (see Hardy 1949, p.19f.). 
Finally we may speculate as to what might have happened had someone such 
as Leibniz, Poisson or De Morgan noticed the relationship between Grandi’s 
series and cosmology. Presumably, if they had followed Norton’s 1999 
analysis, they would have set Grandi’s series equal to ½ and reached  
xˆ21 rG   for the net force (recall §3.1.1, above). But even then the direction 
of the force is indeterminate. Perhaps they would then have concluded that the 
only force compatible with an indeterminate direction was F=0, and that this 
was anyway the ‘average’ of xˆ21 rG   in all possible directions. Whatever 
the case, this would have made for a particularly interesting alternative history. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The complex web of interrelated assumptions which make up ‘Newtonian 
cosmology’ are thus at least partially disentangled. In the course of this analysis 
we learn a little more about why inconsistencies eluded us in the past, and how 
these inconsistencies eventually came to light. What was required was for 
someone with the relevant expertise to ask the right question. In addition, the 
fine distinction between inferences (I) and (I*) was crucial. Such issues are 
more important to cosmology than other science, because within cosmology 
only a tiny subset of conceivable experiments can actually be carried out. 
Advances which can be made without the need for experiment are thus most 
valuable. Similarly in the current age of science, where it is becoming more and 
more difficult and expensive to test theories by experiment, the more we can 
learn about our theories without having to turn to the laboratory the more 
                                                 
25
 For more on Poisson and divergent series see Grattan-Guinness 1990, p.731f. 
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chance we have of taking the next step forward. Reflecting on the mistakes of 
past science may in some small way help us to take that next step. 
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